Military intelligence is underutilized in the study of civil war violence. Declassified records are hard to acquire and difficult to explore with the standard econometrics toolbox. I investigate a contemporary government database of civilians targeted during the Vietnam War. The data are detailed, with up to 45 attributes recorded for 73,712 individual civilian suspects. I employ an unsupervised machine learning approach of cleaning, variable selection, dimensionality reduction, and clustering. I find support for a simplifying typology of civilian targeting that distinguishes different kinds of suspects and different kinds targeting methods. The typology is robust, successfully clustering both government actors and rebel departments into groups that mirror their known functions. The exercise highlights methods for dealing with high dimensional found conflict data. It also illustrates how aggregating measures of political violence masks a complex underlying empirical data generating process as well as a complex institutional reporting process.
Introduction
Civil wars blur the line between civilians and combatants. This is the fundamental problem for governments that must separate rebels from innocents and for civilians wanting to remain neutral and safe. Military and police forces expend enormous resources attempting to identify and eliminate specific individuals fighting for violent groups. What do those programs look like from the inside? How do they pick their targets? How effective are they, and how are their costs distributed across both civilian and rebel supporters?
Targeting programs are necessarily secretive, which makes government records hard to come by. When available, they tend to consist of unwieldy, unstructured, and often undigitized intelligence dossiers, which makes quantitative analysis an expensive proposition. 1 Because of these problems, nearly all existing studies of targeting programs are either qualitative in nature (Moyar & Summers, 1997; Comber, 2008; Natapoff, 2009 ) or depend on data developed from nongovernment sources like interviews, surveys, and news reports (Ball et al., 2007; Silva et al., 2009) . 2 When declassified government records are available, they tend to be at the event level, like attacks (Biddle et al., 2012; Berman et al., 2011) or air operations (Lyall, 2014) without details on the victims. The rare exception are peacetime police records like Stop and Frisk data from New York, which provide information on both demographic details about the suspect and details of the altercation (Gelman et al., 2007) .
I analyze an electronic database of civilian targeting efforts created during the Vietnam War. The data are extensive, covering 73,712 individual rebel suspects from the perspective of the government's police and military operations. The database contains detailed information on both the victims and the operations targeting them. 3 At issue are two central questions.
The first is descriptive: How exactly does a civilian targeting program work in practice? All civilian targeting programs are secretive, but the Phoenix Program is uniquely surrounded in historical controversy. During and immediately after the war critics and proponents debated whether it was a broad intelligence and policing effort or simply a punitive assassination program (Colby & McCargar, 1989) . Since the war, the discussion has turned to whether the Phoenix Program achieved its aims of neutralizing high ranking targets (Thayer, 1985) . More recently, it has been asked why the program caught some suspects while letting others escape, and what implications that might have for civilians deciding whether to join rebellion (Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007) .
The second is theoretical: How should we conceptualize civilian targeting? Is there a simpler topology we can use to classify violence against civilians in terms of the kinds of victims or the kinds of methods employed? Much of the work on civilian targeting either explicitly or implicitly dissagregates along the severity of targeting, treating killings as distinct from arrests because they are theoretically different or easier to document. Others divide targeting along how the victims are selected, particularly whether they were individually singled out or targeted as part of a larger group (Kalyvas 2006) . Is there a principled and data driven way to categorize and describe civilian 1 Two prime examples include the East German Stasi files which came into public stewardship, and the Guatemalan National Police Archive which is now in the charge of government and international humanitarian agencies as part of a truth and reconciliation effort (Aguirre et al., 2013) . The records are comprehensive but unstructured and will require a major effort to analyze once the all of the raw documents are digitized (Price et al., 2009) . 2 For some of the issues and methodology of working with retrospective sources see (Price & Ball, 2014; Seybolt et al., 2013) . 3 With few exceptions, the database and most declassified intelligence products from the Vietnam War have remained unused. This is partially because working with found data is technically challenging, requiring extensive cleaning and documentation-and partially because the tools for such data are only now gaining popularity in the social sciences.
targeting?
Providing an answer to both questions requires a highly inductive and multivariate approach. The overall analytical strategy is familiar in the machine learning literature. I start with a database I did not create and for which I have partial, incomplete documentation. Using clues like patterns of missingness, I determine that there are related groups of attributes and records drawn from completely different sub-populations of suspects. I then show how to prioritize and reduce the over forty available attributes for each suspect to a manageable core group of key facts. I finally perform dimensionality reduction on those facts, finding useful and easy to understand dimensions on which both suspects and targeting tactics varied-providing an answer to both how we should conceptualize civilian targeting and how the Phoenix Program operated.
In the course of conducting the analysis, I intend the chapter to serve as a primer for handling large, multivariate, found conflict data. An increasing number of scholars works with observational data that they did not create, and over which they had no control. They spend extraordinary effort on model specification for a suspected empirical data generating process, but typically pay little attention to the institutional data generating process underlying the reporting and recording of facts. The Phoenix Program database provides an example of how working with found data is at best an adversarial relationship. This poses unique problems for inference, but I demonstrate some of the growing number of tools that help to tackle these kinds of problems.
The road map of the chapter is as follows. The second section provides an empirical background for civilian targeting during the Vietnam War. The third section provides a broad overview of the data created to track that targeting. A detailed examination of the database reveals undocumented heterogeneity between different kinds of records, groups of related attributes, and a ranking attributes' importance, pinpointing exactly where to start the analysis.
Section four develops a taxonomy of victims. Dimensionality reduction on a set of key attributes reveals two key differences between suspects: (1) priority, those who the government wishes it could target and those it targets in practice; and (2) severity, how violent the suspect's final fate, ranging from voluntary defection, to arrest or capture, and at the extreme, death.
Section five develops a taxonomy of tactics. Dimensionality reduction on just observations where the government carried out an operation (killings and arrests) reveals differences between tactics along: (1) priority, but also premeditation, how specifically the individual was targeted prior to the arrest or killing; and (2) domain, whether a suspect was targeted in operations with some connection to policing and intelligence resources, or whether the suspect was targeted by third party forces and then retroactively reported.
A final section concludes with broader implications for security studies and suggests avenues for future research.
The Empirical Background: War in South Vietnam and the Phoenix Program
In the later years of the Vietnam War, the South Vietnamese government went on the offensive against the nonmilitary members and supporters of the rebel opposition. While politically effective, the 1968 Tet-Offensive was a military setback for irregular forces that shifted the main military threat from the organized rural insurgency to the incoming conventional forces from North Vietnam. The government took advantage of this shift by pushing out into rural areas, projecting its power with a wide range of police, militia, military, and special forces units. With the expansion of government control and a flood of funds, logistical support, and U.S. advisers, the government set out to map, monitor, and police its civilian population at an industrial scale. Goals were set out to dismantle the political opposition with widespread arrests, killings, and induced defections. The Phoenix Program (Phung Hoang) was created in 1968 to coordinate this initiative -which was, in reality, fractured across dozens of separate intelligence and police initiatives across South Vietnam. Its substance as an institution included national guidelines that influenced targeting goals and reporting, as well as physical offices containing advisors who coordinated and distributed information on suspects. While the program was not responsible for directly acting against suspects, it was instrumental in bringing together and documenting all of the scattered existing efforts (Moyar & Summers, 1997) . It was in operation until it collapsed during the Eastertide invasion by North Vietnam at the end of 1972. 4 The process by which the program collected information was scattered and disjoint. Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers (IOCCs) maintained Lists of Communist Offenders and sometimes detailed maps of hamlets, with names of occupants and photographs. 5 Military units like the 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (mechanized) sometimes formed special teams from its military intelligence detachment to coordinate with and make up for weak IOCCs in their area, maintaining their own card file in addition to the Local List of Communist Offenders. 6 Additionally, village, district, and province chiefs often maintained their own parallel intelligence nets and records. 7 In January of 1969, the Office of the Secretary through the Advanced Research Projects Agency (the predecessor to DARPA) began Project VICEX to develop a country- wide information reporting system to coordinate and allow comparative analysis of IOCC information. 8 Biographical data on suspects and neutralizations were entered into the national database at district and province IOCCs. Enumerators were trained with coding guidelines for converting dossiers and neutralization reports into a standardized format. 9 The data were then passed up to the Phung Hoang Directorate and from there to the National Police Command Data Management Center, where they were recorded using punch-cards before being entered onto magnetic tape with an IBM360 mainframe.
Overview of the Targeting Database
The United States preserved an electronic copy of the final targeting database called the National Police Infrastructure Analysis Subsystem II (NPIASS-II). 10 It contains records from July 1970 to December 1972. This is the later period of the war, following the Tet Offensive, the GVN and the U.S. counter attack, and the period of U.S. withdrawal. It contains data on 73,717 individuals (rows) that I refer to as suspects and who serve as the unit of observation. It contains 45 attributes (columns) that provide information on each suspect about their biography, job, details of operations targeted against them, and their final disposition. 11 The attributes are of mixed types including numerical, nominal, dates, and nested lookup codes such as locations (e.g. region->province->district->village) and rebel jobs (e.g. National Liberation Front->Liberation Woman's Association->Personnel). The structure of the database is outlined in The first-order task with found data such as these is to verify the structure of the database. Available codebooks often do not document important details, and when they do, the documentation is often at odds with how the database was used in practice. I take a two-pronged approach. First, I point to archival evidence about the genesis of and day-to-day use of the program. In particular, I located detailed coding instructions for a precursor database, the VCI Neutralization and Identification Information System (VCINIIS), which appears to share most if not all of the same properties of the final NPIASS-II database. 12 Second, I apply a machine learning approach to the structure of the database overall, not just the tabular values of individual variables. Patterns of missing values, the meaning of different variables, and heterogeneity between different kinds of observations are all targets of inquiry.
One revelation from the documentation of the predecessor system is that the database combines two different kinds of records: those entered while a suspect was still at large (a biographical record) and those entered after a suspect had already been killed, captured, or defected (a neutralization record). The two kinds of records resulted from different worksheets, with separate text examples, and coding guidelines. Neutralization records appear to have recorded the Phoenix Program as it actually happened on the ground. Two thirds of suspects, 48,074 (65%), were entered in as neutralization records. Biographical records were a kind of growing wish list where analysts bothered to digitize information from the much larger pool of suspects with dossiers, on blacklists, or reported in the Political Order of Battle. A third of suspects, 25,638 (35%), were entered this way.
The second important division in the database is along the fate of each suspect, as still at large, killed, captured, or defector (rallier). All bibliographic records start off as at large suspects. In rare cases (6.6%), some were updated to show the suspect had later been neutralized, though there are sufficient irregularities to suspect that some of these are actually coding errors.
The Phoenix Program was not, at least predominately, an assassination program. The dominant form of neutralization was arrests/captures (45%). A smaller share (24%) of neutralizations were suspects that turned themselves in, defecting. Killings made up only a third of neutralizations documented by the database (31%).
Example Narrative and Coding
To illustrate the kinds of information available (and the kinds of facts that are omitted), I provide the following comparison of a suspect's record in the database with their detailed interrogation report. The record was deanonymized by manually comparing data fields against reported details in declassified interrogation reports from the Combined Military Interrogation Center (CMIC). 13 Below is a brief narrative of a suspect's life, career, circumstance of defection, and immediate aftermath drawn from his interrogation report and with facts corroborated by the NPIASS-II database underlined in the text.
In 1929, a man named To Van Xiem was born in Thai Binh Province (North Vietnam). He attended four years of village school and worked on his parents' farm until January 1950 where he joined the Viet Minh. He was a probationary member beginning June 1950 and became a full party member in 1951. Over the next sixteen years he was promoted or reassigned to multiple roles within North Vietnam until February 25, 1966 , when he and fifty-six other civilian political cadre infiltrated South Vietnam, arriving in Tay Ninh Province. In July of that year, he was assigned as a cadre of the Ca Mau Province Party Committee Farmers' Association Section. In March of 1967 he was reassigned to the same position in Soc Trang Province. In September 1969 he became a member of the Current Affairs Section of the Farmers' Association Section, living in Ba Xuyen Province. He was a Buddhist, middle class farmer, married twice with several children. Citing increasing hardships, limited rations, and almost total government control of the province, he defected at Xuyen District, Ba Xuyen Province on March 21, 1971. He was previously unknown to security forces, not listed on any blacklist, and his identity was confirmed by confession. Four days later, March, 25, 1971, his neutralization was entered into the national database. He was assigned a VCI serial number 41-100825, indicating a new, previously unlisted neutralization record. He was interrogated July 25, 1971 by the Combined Military Interrogation Center (CMIC) in Saigon where he was assigned a CMIC number of 0297-71. Details from his interrogation produced a 30 page report that documented the names and details of 52 other individuals as well as a number of regional organizations.
The Attributes
The full list of 45 attributes are provided below in Table 2 . Attributes are arranged into groups, determined using a combination of descriptions from the codebooks and an unsupervised clustering method described fully below. I have further aggregated the groups into four broad concepts; attributes that are always available, typically only available for biographical records, typically only available for neutralization records, and only available for neutralization records of suspects who defected or were captured. 
Grouping Attributes and Records
The codebooks provide descriptions of each attribute but they omit important details such as how missing values are handled. Every observation has at least some missing attributes and nearly 50% of cells are empty. Some of the patterns are self-explanatory, e.g. there will be no information about sentencing if the suspect is still at large. In other cases, missingness is more subtle, e.g. information on the suspect's age is sometimes missing for suspects who were killed in the field without questioning. In all cases there appears to be a combination of missing at random and undocumented structure. This ambiguity and apparent latent structure suggests applying a machine learning approach to learning how attributes are related to one another. I frame this as a blockclustering problem where the task is to simultaneously find r groups of attributes and k groups of observations that are similar in terms of missingness. Let an I × Q binary matrix, X NA , represent the missingness for each individual i and attribute q, shown on the left in Figure 1 . The task is to decompose this matrix into a version sorted by row and column into homogenous blocksX NA , shown on the right side of Figure 1 , and a smaller r by k binary matrix of row and column clusters.
I employ an unsupervised bi-clustering algorithm, the Bernoulli Latent Block Model (Govaert & Nadif, 2003) . 14 The model is fit with a wide range of possible row and col-umn cluster counts, and the final model is selected with the best fit according to the integrated complete likelihood (ICL) (Biernacki et al., 2000) . The structure of missingness in the NPIASS-II database is best explained by 11 clusters of attributes and 9 clusters of observations (ICL= −260339.9). For substantive reasons discussed next, I further split off dossier related attributes as a separate cluster bringing the total to 12. These are the low level groups of attributes shown in Table 2 .
In almost every case, the method has recovered known groups of variables as detailed in the codebook. In a few cases it has correctly identified an attribute as belonging to a different group despite a misleading original variable name. The six record clusters recover the undocumented split between biographical records and neutralization records, the existence of neutralizations with additional follow up information about sentencing and release, and the existence of a small number of biographical records that were updated with neutralizations. Since these record clusters might have further substantive implications, I include record cluster as an additional attribute in the analysis below.
Why devote special care to analysis of missingness? In this instance, motivation comes from a discovered detail with major substantive implications for the only other recent study to use this database. Kalyvas & Kocher (2007) ask whether a suspect with weak evidence against them was more or less likely to be neutralized than a suspect with strong evidence against them. They focus on the dossier attribute called "confirmed" which is when a suspect is identified by three different sources or one irrefutable source. They find that confirmed suspects, with presumably more evidence against them, were actually much less likely to be neutralized than unconfirmed suspects. If true, this would have a troubling implication that the guilty can be much safer than the innocent from government targeting in an insurgency.
In fact, this counter-intuitive result turns entirely on a technical detail; "confirmed" and a few other dossier related attributes were stored as a 0/1 bit flag in original IBM360 system. When they were converted to modern formats, 0 values were converted to "No" instead of missing and so all 48,074 neutralization records were accidentally counted as unconfirmed neutralizations. Confirmation may have played a role in neutralization, but the database does not record it in a way that makes the desired comparison possible. This is a tricky mistake to catch, an undocumented difference in record types plus an undocumented imputation of values. However, it pops out in this analysis of missingness since there appears to be at least two different kinds of records mixed together and all of the other dossier attributes tend to be missing for neutralization records. It also pops out in the analysis of attribute importance and interaction that I turn to next.
Variable Selection
Each suspect in the database has potentially over forty known facts about them. If you were forced to describe an observation to someone else, which fact would you start with? 15 What is the single most important fact about a suspect? The second most important fact? The third? And so on. Typically these decisions are made on an ad hoc basis given the researcher's theoretical interests. Here, the focus is in part learning the structure of the database and so we need a principled definition of what makes an attribute important, and a method for ranking attributes on that dimension.
I frame this as an unsupervised learning problem, where the task is to learn rules and relationships between attributes that could be used to distinguish a real observation from a synthetic randomly shuffled version. The only way to tell a real observation from a randomly generated one is to learn patterns of regularity and structure between attributes. In this conception, an attribute is important if it conveys a great deal of information about what other values a suspect's attributes will take. The most important fact is the one that provides the most information for inferring other facts. The least important fact is the one that provides completely unique but orthogonal or potentially random information. 16 The classifier I use for this task is an unsupervised random forest. 17 Random forests are an ensemble method that combines the predictions of many individual base learners. The individual learners in this case are fully grown binary decision trees, each fit to a different random subset of attributes and random subset of observations (Breiman, 2001) . 18 In the supervised case, cut points for covariates are selected to separate observations into increasingly homogeneous groups on some outcome variable. In the unsupervised case, the random forest learns to identify a genuine observation from a synthetic scrambled version (Shi & Horvath, 2006) . This method works for both cat-egorical and continuous variables and is non-parametric, so there's no need for prior knowledge of an underlying functional form.
The most useful information for this learning task is provided by strong and regular relationships between variables, and so each decision tree will tend to select variables with multiple strong interactions earlier in the process, toward the root of the tree. Therefore, I measure the importance of a variable as the average distance from the root node to its maximal subtree (the earliest point in the tree that splits on the variable) (Ishwaran et al., 2010) . The interaction of two variables is captured by the depth of their second-order maximal subtree (the distance from the root node of one variable's maximal subtree within the maximal subtree of the other), as trees tend to split on one variable and then soon split on a related variable. I define a symmetric distance between two variables as the sum of their second-order maximal subtree depths. This distance is small when both variables tend to split close to the root, soon after one another, and large if either splits late in the tree or far from the other. 19 This approach provides two remarkable pieces of summary information shown in Figure 2 . Figure 2: Clustering of attributes by strength of interaction with merges selected to minimize Ward's distance (dendrogram). Rank order importance of each attribute in terms of average maximal subtree depth in an unsupervised learning task (unsupervsied random forest). Smaller rank means an attribute was selected sooner in the random forest construction and is thus more informative overall.
The first piece of summary information is a ranking of variables in terms of how much information they convey about the entire dataset. The answer of the question "Which fact should we start with?" is definitively the fate of the suspect: still at large, killed, captured, or defector. No other single attribute implies as much about the remaining details as that one. The next most important is the suspect's gender, followed by whether they were a party member, the kind of record as estimated by the blockclustering above, the suspect's echelon, the source of information used to ID the suspect, and so on.
The second is a pairwise distance between attributes in terms of how much information their interaction conveys about the entire dataset. Hierarchically clustering attributes on that distance reveals what appears to be two mostly unconnected data generating processes: one related to the creation of biographical records and dossiers, and another related to the neutralization of suspects. The method has, without prompting, correctly recovered the undocumented difference between neutralization record attributes and biographical record attributes. Justifying earlier concerns, the dossier attribute "confirmed" is flagged as being closely related to other administrative details of dossiers and not the core demographic attributes of suspects or the empirical process of targeting. 20 The clustering also pinpoints the place to start the analysis: a core group of 21 highly related and informative attributes relating to the neutralization and demographics of suspects. They are flanked by tangential groups of attributes relating to the sentencing of a suspect, the release of a suspect, and the details of dossiers for biographical records. There may be interesting structure within these other groups of attributes, but they are mostly orthogonal to the core outcomes of interest and so can be safely set aside for future work.
Having selected a core group of attributes, the next question is whether they can be further summarized by a simpler topology. The next two sections unpack these attributes and tackle dimensionality reduction with respect to two themes; the kinds of victims, and the kinds of government operations. For that analysis, I weed the list further to just 11 nominal demographic and neutralization attributes. I set aside dates and locations. I exclude 5 attributes about the administrative aspects of the dataset. And I single out two attributes, with a large number of categories, for detailed analysis: the job of the suspect and the government actor responsible for the neutralization.
The Victims of Targeting
Who were the Phoenix Program's victims? The program was charged with dismantling nonmilitary rebel organizations in South Vietnam. 21 A full breakdown of suspect counts by organization, demographic attributes, and final status is shown Table 3. 20 This is all the more amazing because the variable is incorrectly imputed with values for the majority of rows in the dataset. The method has correctly identified the subset of rows for which the variable takes on meaningful values and has grouped it with related variables accordingly. 21 With captured documents and defector reports, GVN and U.S. intelligence analysts mapped those organizations in great detail (Conley, 1967, 165 Table 3 : Cross tabulation of demographic properties against outcome.
Broadly, the political opposition to the Republic of Vietnam (GVN) was organized into three groups. Political authority, command, and resources flowed from North Vietnam into South Vietnam through the communist political apparatus, the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP). Indigenous popular support and participation was organized into the subordinate National Liberation Front (NLF), also called the Viet Cong. Together they constructed alternative administrative institutions referred to as Communist Authority Organizations, such as the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG), as well as a number of political organizations designed to involve civilians outside of the communist party.
Together, and with overlapping and changing roles and capabilities, these three organizations embodied foreign authority, popular participation, and political institutions. Four-fifths of neutralizations were against PRP positions with fewer directed toward more indigenous NLF and Communist Organization positions. This is consistent with both the priorities of the program and the timing in the war; the Post-Tet phase was more externally driven by North Vietnam.
Members or supporters performing active roles of these organizations were collectively known as the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). 22 VCI were grouped into Class A VCI that were full or probationary PRP members or leadership and command roles while class B VCI were trained but voluntary members. Where appropriate, roles were replicated at multiple levels of governance called echelons including the hamlet, village, district, province, city, capital, region, and national level.
The broad pattern is one of a program that targeted large numbers of low level suspects, a portfolio of targets that was bottom heavy. Half of neutralizations were B level voluntary/support positions, and a little more than half were previously unknown to security forces. About a fifth of neutralizations were full party members, and about a fifth of neutralizations were at the district or higher echelon. It is unclear, however, whether this is disproportionate to the number of actual rebels holding those positions. If the program selected targets uniformly from the rebel population, these rates are probably proportional to the share of those positions of all rebel members during this period of the war.
There is a strong relationship between the demographics of suspects and methods of targeting. In brief, more important suspects were fewer in number but more directly targeted, either by having a file while at large, or by being killed in an operation. Low level suspects were less likely to have a file at large, and were much more likely to be swept up as arrests or to walk in off the street as a defection.
The cross-tabulation in Table 3 shows this in terms of a single comparison between demographics and the suspect's final status. Targeting was gendered, with female suspects much less likely to be killed or to be targeted as at large. Known party members were more likely to be targeted at large, or killed, while suspects known to not be party members were much more likely to simply be arrested or to defect. The lower the suspect's echelon, the more likely they were simply arrested or defected and the fewer targeted while at large.
The same is true for the level of prior suspicion against the suspect. More prior suspicion is associated with more severe outcomes. Previously unknown suspects tended to be arrested in the field or defectors, not killed. 23 Moving up the ladder of suspicion to the most active list, the target list, and the most wanted list increases the chances that the suspect is killed by an operation or targeted at large. 24 The same pattern holds true for the A or B priority of the suspect's position.
Visualizing the underlying pattern in just the bivariate case is already somewhat overwhelming. Extending the analysis to the multivariate case and developing a simplifying taxonomy is the task of dimensionality reduction that I turn to next. 22 Military personnel serving in organizational roles, e.g. on Military Affairs Committee, could qualify as VCI.
23 By definition, a previously unknown suspect (not on a black list) did not have a biographical record (was not targeted at large). 24 Note that the data speak to the probability of being under suspicion given already being targeted. Estimating changes in the risk of being targeted as a function of suspicion would require additional information about the population of rebels overall.
A Taxonomy of Suspects
Is there a simpler topology for understanding differences between victims? I frame this as a dimensionality reduction problem where nominal values for each of the categorical variables are mapped to common latent dimensions. The method I use for this estimation is Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA). MCA is a multivariate technique analogous to Principal Components Analysis but for unordered categorical data (Lê et al., 2008) .
Let an I × Q matrix represent the values for each individual i and attribute q with K q possible values for each attribute and K total possible values. This matrix is then converted to an I × K disjunctive table (dummy variables for each level of each variable). Rarely used categories disproportionately influence the construction of these dimensions, so I suppress both rare and missing values. 25 I use a variant of the algorithm called Specific Multiple Correspondence Analysis that correctly calculates partial distance between points given levels were dropped (Roux & Rouanet, 2009) . 26 It decomposes the disjunctive table into principle axis representing latent dimensions, points for individuals in that reduced space, and points for each attribute value in the same space. The result is a geometric interpretation of the originally categorical data where suspects and attributes are all now projected into a smaller number of continuous dimensions.
The core variation of the dataset is well summarized by a few latent dimensions, with the first two principal axis accounting for 74% of total variation (inertia). 27 They are summarized in Table 4 . The first dimension (56%) reflects a clear demographic concept of the suspect's importance to the targeting program. At one extreme are unimportant, previously unknown, low level volunteers, often caught in large raids. At the extreme are high level, full party members, that are on the most wanted list, but usually remain at large.
The second dimension (18%) reflects the method of neutralization used. At one extreme are killings, sometimes targeting specific individuals, in operations directed by the local intelligence office. At the other extreme are defections, that required no previous effort by an intelligence office, where the identity was confirmed by the suspects own confession. In between lie arrests which share aspects of both kinds of targeting. This provides a clean language for describing civilian targeting in terms of just two concepts. First, there are suspects the government wishes it could target and those that it actually targets in practice. Second, of those it targets, there is a spectrum ranging from suspects that tend to defect, suspects that tend to be arrested or captured out in the field, and suspects that tend to be assassinated (or who die in battle but the program claims credit). A map of each value in the two dimensions is shown in Figure 3 . f[[[[ K[[[[ O[[[[ .[[[[ 7ttributekMap6k7llkSuspsectsk(N8IK3ICI2 Figure 3 : Attribute values for all suspects projected into two dimensions with multiple correspondence analysis.
For studies that use counts of rebel or civilian deaths as a dependent variable, this shows that those raw counts could be driven by changes in at least three different underlying dynamics: (1) the intensity of the war, growing or shrinking the size of the target list or the number of operations looking for suspects not on a list; (2) changes in effectiveness, neutralizing more or fewer known targets already on the list; or (3) changes in tactics, using more killings than arrests or more defections preempting killings, etc. Shifts along any of these dimensions could produce changes in total body counts or the portfolio of observed violence (e.g. ratios of civilian to military deaths). There is currently little in the way of theoretical expectations for how interventions should interact with each of these dimensions, much less how those interactions should aggregate into changes in total observed levels of violence.
The Jobs Held by Suspects
As an external check of validity, I compare the estimated position of each suspect along the dimensions of targeting to a description of the job they held. If the dimensions are correct, and useful, then jobs with similar functions ought to be more similar to each other in terms of targeting. I find that suspects with similar jobs, as described by third party sources, do in fact have similar demographic attributes and similar targeting behavior by the government. If the underlying data were faked or entered with error, they were at least doing it in a consistent and creative way.
Each suspect is tagged with one of 485 specific jobs, coded according to a standardized official schema called the Greenbook. Each jobs is nested within increasingly large departments called elements, subsections, sections, and the three main branches. Most of the variation across sections is on the first dimension of priority (horizontal axis). At one extreme on the far left are low level logistics related sections like the Commo-Liaison and Rear Service sections, where suspects were rarely targeted at large and mostly swept up as arrests. At the other extreme, on the right, are high level leadership positions like the NLF Central Committee and the Provisional Revolutionary Government where almost every suspect was most wanted but still at large. Along the second dimension of severity of outcome (vertical axis), some sections were likely to be specifically targeted or killed, e.g. Guerilla Units, Military Affairs Section, or Area Administrative Officials. At the other extreme some groups were much more likely to defect, e.g. the Medical Section, the Frontline Supply Council, or the Western Highlands Autonomous People's Movement.
Next I cluster the sections according to their distance along the targeting dimen-sions. 28 The 30 sections with 100 or more suspects are described in Table 5 . They are arranged hierarchically using Ward's method by their proximity in biographical dimensions estimated with MCA above (Ward, 1963) . Each section is provided with a brief description based on their functions as outlined by U.S. intelligence (Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, 1969 The clustering has recovered groups of sections with similar functions, arranged into roughly four themes. The fighting themed cluster contains four large sections including the Guerrilla Unit, Military Affairs, Cadre Affairs, and the Liberation Farmers 28 I calculate euclidean distance on the first three dimensions which account for over 80% of the variation.
Association. All operated at the low village or hamlet level and were high risk in terms of chance of being killed.
A leadership themed cluster includes seven small groups with positions that operated at the village, district, or higher echelon, and were more likely to be targeted while at large or killed if neutralized. This includes the NLF Secretariat, the NLF Central Committee, Area Administration Officials, etc.
There are two village administration themed clusters. The first leans toward higher priority and more violent outcomes. It includes, Political Officers, the Security Section, the Party Office, the Culture and Indoctrination, and the Finance-Economy Section. This captures the main justice, propaganda, and tax collection infrastructure at the district and village level. The second administration themed cluster includes village level Womens' and Youth associations, the Military and Civilian Proselyting Sections, and sections responsible for medical and food production. This captures very local leadership and organization at the village level.
A final logistics themed cluster includes three sections, Special Action, CommoLiaison, and Rear Service. Suspects in these sections were much more likely to be captured, of very low priority in terms of not being party members, not on a wanted list, B level positions, and women.
This set of clusters provides a way to think about targeting the different components of an insurgency: a fighting component, a leadership component, a day to day administration component, and a logistical tail. Both the demographics of suspects and the targeting methods of the government vary systematically across these different components. This is important for studies that use violence over time as a dependent variable. If any of these groups change in size or in level of activity, it will change the aggregate body count in potentially unpredictable ways.
The Methods of Targeting
Killings and arrests required the government to launch an operation, and defections required a receiving government actor or office. Which government actors conducted those operations and what methods did they use? When a suspect is neutralized, the details of the circumstance or operation leading to their neutralization were recorded. The details of each neutralization are cross-tabulated against outcomes in Table 6 : Properties of operations across neutralization outcomes.
The tabulations show a program with a large base of incidental arrests and killings in the course of regular operations topped with a sizable number of direct planned strikes against specific targets. A full third of killings and captures were suspects target by an operation, often an ambush along a route or a raid. About a third were from operations directed by an IOCC. As noted before, more than half of killed or captured suspects were already previously listed on a blacklist.
The identity of a suspect had to be confirmed at the time of neutralization. For previously unidentified suspects, the source of ID at the time of neutralization may have been the source that led them to be a suspect in the first place. For suspects already on a blacklist or listed in the Political Order of Battle, there was some unobserved process by which evidence was collected, leading to the initial suspicion. The majority were either identified by another civilian (an agent or informer) or they were said to have confessed. Others were confirmed by material evidence like documents captured on their person or identifying them by name. Some were confirmed against descriptions in the Political Order of Battle (OB). About 12% were identified as "other" explained in a written comment on the back of the worksheet and not recorded here.
A Taxonomy of Targeting Operations
Neutralizations can also be well summarized by a simpler typology. I fit the same specific multiple correspondence model as before to just the subset of observations resulting in arrest or killing. The first principal axis accounts for 59% of the variation and, as before, reflects the level of priority of the suspect. At one extreme are low level incidental captures and at the other killings against priority targets. To a lesser degree it also captures the level of premeditation, as high priority targets were more likely to be the specific target of an operation and the target of an operation planned and directed by an IOCC. The second principal axis accounts for 15% of the variation and reflects the domain of the operation. On one end are operations that found VCI and reported them retroactively to the intelligence infrastructure for documentation. These operations typically had no IOCC involvement, were carried out by more conventional forces, and at the province or sector level. At the other extreme are operations carried out by Phoenix related forces against targets known about beforehand. These operations were at the subsector or district level, against village echelon level targets, who were on the most active or target black lists, and benefited from information provided by the IOCC. The map of each attribute value along these two dimensions is shown in Figure 5 . 
The Perpetrators of Targeting
There were 16 different organizations reported as the government actor in the neutralization of suspects. As an additional external check of validity, Figure 6 shows the position of the actors along the two dimensions of priority and domain. If the underlying data are accurate and well summarized by these dimensions, then actors with similar functions ought to be similar to each other in terms of victims and tactics. It reveals four small clusters. The first cluster includes urban and suburban police organizations that were much more likely to arrest than kill. This is likely because they were both in areas of greater government control where contestation was less violent overall and because they were more likely to document their arrests than less institutionalized forces.
The second cluster includes mobile forces who operated in areas of weaker government control but still had close ties to the Phoenix Program in terms of intelligence sharing and reporting. Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU), for example, were specially designed units for the Phoenix Program who had the highest rate of neutralizations per fighter (Thayer, 1985, 210) .
The third cluster contains paramilitary forces, Regional Forces were responsible for routes and intersections while Popular Forces were responsible for village and hamlet defense. Their neutralizations were the most violent and numerous. This is because of where they operated (in more contested areas), their high numbers (having more manpower in more places than police forces), and their tactics (equipped and trained for defense and attack rather than regular policing).
A final cluster represents conventional forces: the U.S. and Free World Military Assistance forces (primarily South Korean). These forces reported few suspects to the national database, likely because of parallel reporting mechanisms and also because they were engaged in larger more conventional fighting.
These clusters provide a way to think about targeting as a function of different kinds of government forces: regular police, expeditionary forces, paramilitary forces, and conventional forces. Each employs different tactics, in a different environment, with a different portfolio of victims, and different incentives and capabilities to report back statistics. This is particularly relevant to the study of aggregate levels of violence. Over the course of a conflict, the size and level of activity of these four groups will change. Forces are raised, units move around the country, and police and paramilitary forces are extended to newly secured communities. Each of these will impact the amount of violence committed and the number of casualties reported in a given area over a given period of time.
Conclusion
The Phoenix Program provides an unusually clear view of a large wartime government targeting effort. In the aggregate, it provides an example of a typically mixed targeting program. Most processed neutralizations were of low priority targets, while occasionally the program had the intelligence, or good luck, to launch operations against high-profile targets. This pattern is a result of the fundamental feature of civil war, an inability to easily separate rebels from neutral civilians.
That said, based on the portion of targeting recorded in the national database, the government did track and target a large number of suspects with verifiable links. In the same way that policing is primarily about deterring illegal behavior through small risks of punishment, the Phoenix Program offered a credible risk to rebels who might have otherwise operated openly or civilians who were on the fence about joining.
There is a strong connection between a suspect's demographics, their position in rebel organizations, the kind of government actor that would target them, the methods that would be used, and their ultimate fate. A combination of dimensionality reduction and clustering suggests a few simplifying ways to describe that connection. Suspects vary in priority to the government in terms of who it wishes it could target and who it targets in practice. The outcomes for suspects vary in severity ranging from voluntary defection to death in the field. Operations vary in the priority of the suspect, arresting large numbers of unimportant suspects in sweeps and launching premeditated operations to kill more important suspects. Operations also vary across domains. Some operations are carried out far away from intelligence and police infrastructure and are underreported in official statistics. Other operations are carried out in clear view, often using previous intelligence and regularly reporting back for inclusion in official statistics.
The data also reveal clear organizational differences between different government actors and different rebel sections. Rebel sections have functions that fall into groups related to fighting, high level leadership, low level administration, and logistical support. Government actors fall into groups of regular police, expeditionary forces, paramilitary forces, and conventional forces. Each kind of organizational subdivision has a distinct signature in terms of types of civilians involved and the types of targeting methods employed.
One motivation for moving toward bigger (wider) data in conflict studies is that they reveal these underlying dimensions, organizational types, and processes which typically get relegated to an error term. These results should be a cautionary tale for analysis based on raw event counts, often drawn from newspapers or similarly shallow reporting. Targeting in the Vietnam War was very high dimensional. An analyst could reach dramatically different conclusions about outcomes by truncating the sample to just killings, by omitting information about the suspect's position or the government actor committing the violence, or by missing important details about how the institution created records and aggregated them into a final dataset.
With data this detailed, the analysis provided here is just the tip of the iceberg. I have shown ways to identify and explore the main sources of variation in a database, but there are many other places in the data to look for interesting structure. There are three that come immediately to mind. The first is exploring the spatial and temporal structure of data. The Vietnam War varied from province to province and often from village to village, which should have clear implications for how civilians were treated. The second is how neutralizations were related to one another. I have treated neutralizations as isolated events, but in reality they were often part of larger operations. There is enough detail on locations and timing to aggregate individual observations into a larger event level analysis. Finally, the structure of rebel organizations is an entire field of study on its own, and the detailed data on rebel jobs, locations, and demographics can provide a remarkable map of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese organization across South Vietnam.
